2 group's opinions. 2 The most consequential result emerged from this approach has been the phenomenon known as the 'doctrinal paradox' or the 'discursive dilemma', first described by Lewis Kornhauser and Lawrence Sager, and generalised in a number of 'impossibility theorems' by other authors, mainly Philip Pettit, Christian List, and Franz Dietrich. 3 According to these results, when the members of a group disagree about certain statements, and they form a 'collective opinion' by means of some democratic aggregation procedure, it is possible for the group to reach conclusions that are mutually contradictory, even if each member has an internally coherent set of opinions. Table 1 illustrates this possibility: though a majority of the three members of the group accepts claim A, and a (different) majority accepts B, the majority still rejects the conjoined proposition A&B, and so, the set of claims collectively endorsed becomes logically inconsistent. Table 1 2 A related but different problem, i.e., whether some aggregation rules are capable of producing rational collective judgments out of not-so-rational individual opinions, has not been attacked within this framework until now, but we thing it would be an interesting problem to further discussion, nevertheless.
3
Independently on the position one may have in the philosophical debate about the social nature of knowledge, the negative results we have just mentioned constitute a serious problem, both from a theoretical and from a pragmatical point of view, for there is no doubt that many instances of what we take as 'knowledge' in our complex modern societies, grounded on public deliberation and on the division of intellectual labour, are the result of the 'aggregation' ('interconnection', 'networking', etc.) of a large amount of epistemic inputs provided by separate but interrelated individuals. A particularly important case is that of scientific knowledge itself, which, according to contemporary expositions, basically consists in some kind of negotiated consensus among the specialists, but a consensus that always conceals a number of more or less significant disagreements. 4 It is surprising that the literature on judgment aggregation has escaped the attention of relativistic philosophers of science, for apparently it might provide new arguments to show the lack of objectivity of accepted scientific claims; however, those tempted to follow this road should also be aware that some results have been proved about the probability of 'good' epistemic outputs arising from the aggregation of individual opinions (e.g., List (2005) ; see also Goldman (2004) ). Our aim in this paper is precisely to show that, in spite of the 'impossibility theorems' referred to in the preceding section, certain mechanisms do exist that, at least under some specified circumstances, guarantee the optimality of the procedure according to which individual claims are aggregated, mechanisms in which some of the assumptions made in those theorems are, of course, necessarily relaxed.
4
Contrarily to a high proportion of the work done until now on this problem, the approach we will follow here is not based on social choice theory, but on a different conceptual resource from the theoretical economist's toolkit: constitutional political economy. This is a theory about the collective choice of norms by rational agents. 5 The main idea underlying this approach is that, when a group of people interact to produce some 'social' outcome under some regulated procedure, it is possible that the members of the group have the capacity of jointly deciding what specific rules to establish; if this is the case, we can reasonably assume that the chosen rules will be efficient (in the sense that no other conceivable set of rules would have been better for some member, and at least as good for the rest), and furthermore, if these norms are to be in force during a long period of time, and have to be acceptable for people with different, and even highly conflicting interests, then they will tend to be impartial (in the sense that they would correspond to a choice made 'under a veil of ignorance'). The last hypothesis can be made operational by assuming that the chosen rules will maximise the average expected utility of the group's members.
We will discuss in the remaining sections of the paper two different aggregation situations, which depend on the reasons that individuals may have in the first place to want an aggregation mechanism. Why do they worry at all about having something like a 'collective opinion', as something different from the mere enumeration of their individual judgments? In most cases this will be due not to some intrinsic interest of the members of the relevant collective, but to the demands of people external to the group. Pettit (2001a,b) ). According to this view, a necessary condition for democracy is that political or administrative agencies are 'rationally contestable', i.e., it must be possible for other agents to engage in a reasoned deliberation with the former. Hence, it
is not only that in many circumstances we want that collective agencies 'speak with a single voice', but we also want that the claims endorsed by this 'voice' are logically articulated, so that we can argue against them if we don't find them reasonable, or so that we can defend them on good reasons if we want to persuade somebody else of their validity. If any judgment aggregation mechanism is liable to lead groups in some cases to inconsistent sets of claims, then the very concept of 'public deliberation' would become problematic.
On the other hand, the examples usually employed in the literature on judgment aggregation have been not too fortunately chosen in at least one respect. In general, they have the form of an argument about whether to take one decision or another. In the case of table 1, the 'reasons' would correspond to the first two columns (suppose, e.g., that A is the proposition 'the hurricane will pass through our city', and B 'the hurricane will be 'constitutions' (cf., List and Pettit (2006) ).
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of force x at least'; assume that the decision is whether to take some preventive measures, and that all agree that these must be taken if and only if both A and B are true). The opinions about A and B are epistemic judgments, for they refer to purely factual questions. On the contrary, the judgment presupposed in the third column of the interests, we are just in the traditional realm of social choice theory, which studies the aggregation of preferences, and here we will just ignore this case. The discussion on judgment aggregation presupposes, hence, that there is some disagreement on the relevant facts, but this still leaves room for several possible scenarios. In the following 7 sections we will consider two ideal cases: 7 in the first place, we will assume that agents have purely epistemic preferences, i.e., they only care about the 'distance' between their own individual opinions and the collective claims, but are not worried at all about the practical consequences this distance may entail. In the second place, we will make the opposite assumption: individuals don't care in any way about the epistemic difference between the collective opinion and their own, but they fear that, the most informative this collective opinion is, the higher is the risk of the group taking a decision contrary to their individual interests (if they happen to disagree with the group's opinion). We shall prove that in both scenarios there is an optimal judgment aggregation mechanism (but a different one in each case), under the assumption that the members of the group constrain their decision to the choice of a consistent and deductively closed set of claims. This assumption contradicts one of the conditions on which the impossibility theorems are based: systematicity, i.e., that the same aggregation rule is uniformly applied to all the propositions one by one. 8 But, leaving aside our opinion that there is no a priori reason to prefer rules that obey systematicity, our assumption allows to solve in a simple way the problem of the possible inconsistency of the collective judgments:
since the choice is now directly made on sets of propositions, and not claim by claim, the members of the group just abstain from including among the available options those sets that are internally inconsistent. Furthermore, if the options only include deductively closed sets of propositions, then all the possible deductive relations between 7 We do not assume that these two extreme cases exhaust the logical possibilities, but leave for further work the analysis of intermediate situations. 8 The rules considered here correspond to the class that List and Pettit (2006, p. 12 ) identify as 'set-wise supervenience: The set of group judgments on all the propositions in the agenda is robustly a function of the individual sets of judgments on (some or all of) these propositions'. And it is important not to forget that this is primarily a problem for the members of the group, and not for the philosopher observing them from the outside. This is what justifies our contractarian approach: judgment aggregation mechanisms need not be justified by means of philosophical or mathematical arguments (though some of these can obviously be relevant), but mainly by means of the practical advantages or disadvantages that having one mechanism or another will have for the people whose judgments are going to be aggregated.
JUDGMENT AGGREGATION BY PURELY EPISTEMICALLY ORIENTED AGENTS.
Imagine there is a group composed by an odd number (n) of individuals, 9 each one having a certain opinion about k independent atomic propositions, p 1 , p 2 , ..., p k .
Since we assume that every individual has a definite judgment about every proposition, we say that each agent believes a complete and consistent theory. In this propositional framework, complete theories can be axiomatised by a proposition of the form:
where each symbol '±' is to be replaced by a negation or by nothing; since every proposition is assumed to be logically independent of the rest, these complete theories are consistent (inconsistencies will only take place in someone accepts p n and ¬p n ). Each complete and consistent theory is then equivalent to some row of a traditional truth between the theory which is collectively adopted and the theory she personally believes.
11
This distance can be measured in a very straightforward way:
mismatches between p and q), and hence I will assume that the utility i receives if theory q is collectively accepted is given by the formula u i (q) = 1 -d(q,p i ). From these assumptions, several interesting theorems can be derived:
(1) For every distribution of individual opinions, there is one theory which maximises the sum of the individual utilities. This is straightforward: given the opinions of the individuals, each complete theory will have associated with it a certain degree of total utility, and for one of these theories this sum will have a maximum value. 11 A much more relevant question is whether the members of the group have some way of finding which one the optimum theory is. The following two theorems show that this is certainly the case: premisebased majority voting PMV (which consists in each member casting a separate vote on each atomic proposition p n , and selecting as the collective judgment p n or ¬p n , depending on which option receives more votes), has the desired properties.
(2) The outcome of PMV maximises the sum of the individual utilities. 10 The notion of 'logical distance' between propositions or states of affairs has been particularly exploited within the literature on 'truth approximation' or 'verisimilitude' (cf. I. Niiniluoto, , Dordrecht, D. Reidel, 1987) .
Truthlikeness
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Proof: For each atomic proposition p j , majority voting guarantees that the outcome has fewer mismatches with the individual opinions about p j than its negation.
(3) PMV is non manipulable.
Proof: For each atomic proposition, no individual can attain a higher utility level by voting the negation of the proposition she accepts, than by voting this proposition.
So, PMV can be seen as the optimal judgment aggregation rule for agents that have the type of preferences assumed in this section. 12 Of course, by accepting the outcome of this voting mechanism, the group will be committed to accept many claims that some members would individually reject, and it is also possible that some propositions the group is forced to accept (because they logically follow from the adopted complete theory) are rejected by a majority. Furthermore, it would not be strange that the outcome of PMV were a theory that everybody would individually reject! In our scenario, however, this would only be an apparently dramatic conclusion, because the voted theory is just taken as something that represents in the best possible way the variety of opinions of the group's members. It is really the result of a compromise, and, as in most cases of bargaining, the final outcome simply does not for which the sum of distances to indivudal judgments is not optimal, and hence B cannot be optimal. (The proof depends on there being an even number of individuals, of course).
coincide with the optimum choice of any of the parties, though it minimises the aggregated losses. 
JUDGMENT AGGREGATION BY CYNICAL AGENTS.
We are going to consider next a situation which, in a sense, is a mirror image of the previous one. In section 2, we have assumed that the members of the group only care about how far the collective opinion lies from their own individual judgment about the truth. The practical consequences that the group will draw from having formed one opinion or another have not been taken into account, or have been simply assumed to have an effect on each individual's utility function that is strictly proportional to the distance between the collective and the individual judgment. But this will certainly not happen in many real situations (perhaps scientific research is the best example of an institution relatively close to the idealised one depicted in section 2). Now we will assume, instead, that the individuals are utterly cynical, in the sense that, no matter how 'close' your personal opinion is from the collectively agreed one, if the latter is inconsistent with the former (i.e., if your own preferred theory happens to 'loose' in the voting), then the collective judgment will be interpreted by the winners in the most beneficial way for them, and the least beneficial way for you (i.e., they will use the collective judgment to justify those practical decisions that satisify in the best possible 13 Two complications that will be study in the final version of the paper refer to the conventional nature of the choice of atomic propositions, and to the possibility of individuals having a reservation utility from not reaching a consensus. The first problem relates to the phenomenon of This is the problem known as 'language variance', well known in the literature on truthlikeness, and first identified by David Miller.
14 way their own interests, at the cost of yours). Logic imposes some limits to this cynical use of reason, but the limits are often wide enough as to permit a considerable degree of exploitation of those that disagree on the public opinion. Our strategy in this section will be to assume that the members of the group, knowing this, may want to establish some constitutional mechanism that minimises the chances of being exploited, or, more exactly, that maximises the difference between the benefits they derive when they win and the costs they suffer when they lose. Now the agents can choose, not only amongst complete theories, but amongst all consistent and deductively closed set of sentences.
accept, she will prefer the less contentful; these assumptions reflect the 'cynical' attitude agents have towards the collectively adopted claims: if a member of the group agrees with the collective opinion, then she will want this opinion to be as strong as possible, but if she disagrees, she will want it to be as weak as possible. On the other hand, (4.c-e) are assumed by analytical convenience ('Taut' stands by the tautology); in particular, (4.d) seems reasonable when discussing a choice made 'under a veil of ignorance'. 15 A possible objection to (4.b) has been suggested to us by Franz Dietrich: if an individual beliefs p&q&r, this assumption entails that she will prefer that ¬p&q is collectively adopted, rather than ¬p&q&r, though in the latter case a new proposition accepted by her has been added. Our answer is simply that those individuals that happen to have this type of preferences (or those situations that generate this type of payoffs)
are well represented by the scenario modelled in section 2. On the contrary, when people is afraid of linguistic manipulation of reasons, the new assumptions seem more reasonable. Take into account that the 'distances' between the different theories may depend on the set of concepts with which the language operates (rec. note 13), and, in absence of a clearly predetermined way of 'measuring' the similarity between several propositions, those 'distances' become extremely subjective. Fig. 1 represents this possibility: the individual opinion is p&q&r (the dotted area), ¬p&q is the area shadowed with horizontal lines, whereas ¬p&q&r is the area with vertical lines. In this example it is clear that the weaker theory ¬p&q is 'closeer' to the individual opinion than the stronger theory ¬p&q&r, though this includes an additional claim the agent accepts. We are not assuming that examples like this one are the norm, but, as long as 16 the possibility exists of using the collectively accepted claims to take decisions that serve to exploit the 'dissidents', our new hypotheses about individual utility functions become more justifiable. Figure 1 From the point of view of the group's members, the most important fact is that, in each collective choice situation, there will be some theory for which the sum of individual utilities attains a maximum, and agents would like to have an aggregation procedure which systematically leads the group to accept that theory. We will show that there is a mechanism that, even if it fails to select the optimum theory in each particular collective choice, it generates an optimal pattern of choices on the average. By theory based majority voting (TMV) we will refer to a process in which the members of the p q r
